With the Syrian track running aground in Geneva in March, both US
President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak turned
their attention to the equally troubled Palestinian talks and its
imposing set of deadlines for concluding a final peace treaty by
September. The Palestinian Authority ended a six-week boycott of
talks, after the US brokered a revised timetable for completing the
difficult negotiations. Yet the renewed formal parleys remained
unfruitful, so Clinton hosted Barak and PA chairman Yasser Arafat for
separate summits at the White House in April in hopes of spurring
progress. But the same recipe that doomed discussions with Damascus
seems primed to repeat itself in the Oslo end game, as Israel is
offering substantial concessions while the PA refuses to budge from
square one.
RESETTING THE CLOCK: As February ended, US special Mideast
envoy Dennis Ross spent an intense week shuttling between Barak and
Arafat to try to end the PA walkout, but he left Jerusalem empty
handed as the Israelis showed some give but the Palestinians were not
taking. At the time, Barak handed Ross a series of concessions to
convey to Arafat, but the package of gestures was rejected by the PA,
which broke off talks on February 5 over disputes concerning the
scope of two remaining interim IDF pullbacks in Judea/Samaria.The two
sides also were quarreling over the need for completing an overdue
conceptual framework agreement before tackling the thorny issues to
be addressed in a final peace treaty - borders, settlements, refugees
and Jerusalem. At the heart of the standoff was a Palestinian ploy to
gain control over as much of the disputed lands as possible during
the interim stage – including contiguous blocks and Arab
villages surrounding Jerusalem – in order to deprive Israel of
any meaningful territorial bargaining chips in final-status talks and
to enhance Arafat’s option of declaring a state at any time.
But the unflappable Ross swiftly returned to the region and
managed to overcome differences that had stalled the tandem of
interim and final-status talks for a month. Ross brought Barak and
Arafat together for an uncommon trio of face-to-face meetings within
48 hours – the last one hosted by Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak in Sinai – in which they agreed to resume official talks
in late March in Washington, provided Israel first implemented the
delayed 6.1% interim IDF withdrawal in Judea/Samaria. The revived
talks would concentrate on drafting the framework agreement for
permanent status arrangements by mid-May, while also working out the
terms for the last interim IDF withdrawal to be carried out by the
end of June. As the concluding step, the parties reaffirmed they
would negotiate and sign by September 13 a comprehensive accord
resolving all final-status issues.
To achieve the breakthrough, the PA gave in to Barak’s
proposals to retain the framework accord as a useful "way
station" on the road to peace and to place it (especially its
guidelines on "borders") ahead of the last interim
pullback. On the other hand, Arafat edged closer to greater US
involvement with the stateside venue for negotiations, and also
received a firm commitment from Barak to stick to the September
deadline. The biggest area of contention remained over the scope of
the final interim redeployment, and reports in Israel claimed Arafat
accepted the revamped time frame after Barak secretly committed to
handing over coveted Arab villages bordering Jerusalem – already
under PA civil rule – in the June pullout.
Even with the forward movement, Barak still had his eye on a
Syrian deal, while Arafat was leading a chorus of Palestinian threats
to declare a state in September regardless of Israel’s opinion
and to take land by force if their demands were not met. Arafat did a
lot of public grumbling about how he had helped put Barak in office
by postponing statehood last May, but was now suffering a huge let
down over the Israeli leader. Barak is "even worse than
Netanyahu," charged Arafat. Tensions stirred by the harsh PA
rhetoric were compounded by Israel’s dramatic bust of a Hamas
terror cell in the Israeli Arab town of Taiba – only 4 miles
from Barak’s own home – and discovery of big caches of
bomb-making materials in nearby Tulkarm and inside a kindergarten in
Gaza.
Nonetheless, the month-long hiatus in official talks indeed ended
in mid-March when the interim negotiating teams met locally to iron
out lingering differences over the 6.1% withdrawal, the northern
"safe passage" route and a goodwill release of Palestinian
prisoners. But the hyper-sensitive Jerusalem issue rose to the fore
again, just as the two sides prepared for the first round of
final-status talks in Washington – and for the historic visit of
Pope John Paul II.
A CAPITAL CONCERN: Barak faced a mounting domestic revolt
from the nationalist camp after news surfaced he had secretly dangled
the Jerusalem suburb of Anata before the PA as part of the 6.1%
withdrawal. He reversed course to prevent an untimely break-up of his
government, as three out of six coalition partners threatened to bolt
over the miscue. The row highlighted the dilemma Barak faces in
reaching a unified position on the city even with the dovish half of
his government, as several key advisers and Cabinet members competed
to see who could field the most attractive solution for resolving the
Jerusalem question. Some argued that Israel should accept a
Palestinian capital on the outskirts of the contested city and even
Palestinian administration in Arab "boroughs" within its
municipal boundaries, prompting Opposition MKs to counter that Israel
instead needed to retain a protective ring of Jewish areas around
Jerusalem. Barak criticized both sides for dragging up the extremely
problematic issue so soon, since he personally favors deferring
discussions over Jerusalem until after most other issues are settled
in the September peace accord.
Not to be ignored, the Palestinians made clear they will not
accept Abu Dis or other suburbs as a substitute capital to east
Jerusalem itself. The PLO’s top figure in "Al Quds,"
Faisal Husseini, warned that unless they get full control of the
eastern half of Israel’s capital, including the walled Old City,
the Palestinians could "choose the other road" of violence.
"We are so happy… they are giving the example for us,"
Husseini said of Hizb’Allah.
The Israeli Cabinet approved the maps for the 6.1% pullback, which
Barak altered to give the PA lands closer to Jerusalem, thus giving
up an important principle whereby Israel alone was allowed to
designate what areas were to be ceded in the interim period. The
painful pullout was swiftly carried out on the Jewish holiday of
Purim. The transfer leaves Arafat with full control of 18% of
Judea/Samaria, civilian control over another 21.7%, and rule over 98%
of the entire Palestinian population. But as the negotiations
convened for eight days of "brainstorming" at Bolling Air
Force Base outside Washington under a media blackout, the developing
security nightmare for Israelis due to the emerging confused
patchwork of Israeli and PA controlled zones in YESHA was highlighted
by a pair of shooting incidents in the Hebron Hills and roadside
bombs in Gaza.
SETTLING THE SCORE: The YESHA Council concluded that Barak
had breached the accord he negotiated with them immediately after his
election concerning government policies on settlement growth, and
decided to establish new outposts and protest the government’s
"drying up" of YESHA communities and freeze on 12 bypass
roads deemed essential by the IDF. The Israeli High Court provided
the last straw, when it ruled that 700 seasonal Arab cave-dwellers
could temporarily return to the disputed Maon Farm area, where young
settler activists were forcefully evicted last November. The Council
demanded that Jews be permitted to return to Maon as well, and moved
in equipment there and at other sites to erect new Jewish
neighborhoods in approved planning areas. In an instant replay, IDF
soldiers again evacuated a group of settlers from Havat Maon.
Barak is hemmed in between the pro-settlement camp, which is
threatening to topple his government over any further land
concessions - especially around Jerusalem - and the Palestinian side,
which reportedly is preparing a military response in conjunction with
its plans for declaring a Palestinian state if peace talks do not win
them control over all YESHA by September. One PA official warned, "If
the talks fail, there is no guarantee that the West Bank and Gaza
Strip will not turn into a swamp" – another chilling
Palestinian allusion to Hizb’Allah’s successful formula in
Lebanon for forcing an Israeli retreat.
TWIN BILLING: The dynamics of the Palestinian track changed
dramatically in the wake of Clinton’s failed Geneva summit with
Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad in late March. With a second round of
sequestered talks already plodding away in Washington, Clinton
hurriedly summoned Barak to the White House to see if a final
Israeli-Palestinian accord was a faster route to a Nobel peace prize.
Though the gaps seem far more intractable and perplexing than the few
hundred meters of Kinneret shoreline now separating Jerusalem and
Damascus, Barak nonetheless deposited with Clinton some significant
concessions to deliver to Arafat, whose own meeting at the White
House had been moved up a week to April 20.
As Barak outlined for his Cabinet both before and after his
Washington trip, he was ready to offer recognition of a Palestinian
state in Gaza and on a contiguous area totaling 70-80% of
Judea/Samaria – including Arab villages bordering Jerusalem –
on condition that the PA agree to Israeli annexation of the 10% where
the largest Jewish settlement blocs are located. The Palestinian
"entity" would also have to be demilitarized; Jerusalem
must remain united under Israeli sovereignty; and Arab refugees would
not be permitted to return to Israel. Barak’s frontal approach
on the "statehood" question was a bid to preempt a violent
showdown with Arafat come September by tying down the issue in a
section of the May framework agreement. In addition, he "sweetened"
the framework deal by proposing that it include an early down-payment
of about 3% of the last interim IDF pullback due in June.
But he was merely bargaining with himself, as the unimpressed
Palestinian leadership rejected his conditions and offers outright –
even before Clinton shared them with Arafat in person –
insisting they expect nothing short of complete surrender of 100% of
the disputed lands, including east Jerusalem. Arafat fully explained
to Clinton his decision to unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood
in September, but received no promises regarding American
recognition. At about the same time, he openly ridiculed Barak as
"the leader of the extremists" and dismissed the on-going
talks as "just chat sessions" and "a waste of time."
[Arafat, by the way, has just escaped prosecution in Germany for his
involvement in the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre of 11 Israeli
athletes, as Berlin decided it did not want to disrupt the peace
process.]
The disparate attitudes of the two leaders matched recent press
reports about the official lower-level talks, which maintain that
Israel has been making serious offers, but the Palestinians are
summarily rejecting them and refusing to budge from their maximal
demands. These were contained in a document described as the "Five
No’s" – a play on the infamous "Three No’s"
following the 1973 Yom Kippur War – and include: an Israeli
withdrawal from 90% of Judea/Samaria by June; the right of return for
all Palestinian refugees from 1948; the removal of all Jewish
settlements; PA control over all of eastern Jerusalem, including the
Old City; and no Israeli military presence inside the Palestinian
state.
ALL TAPPED OUT: Currently, US and Israeli officials see
eye-to-eye in their belief it is still possible to complete the
framework by the end of June, and the final peace treaty by
September, but that much depends on Arafat’s willingness to
compromise somewhere. Otherwise, the same formula that led to the
Geneva fiasco with Assad seems destined to play out in the
Palestinian talks too, as Israel is offering significant concessions
while PA positions remain "very rigid" – according to
the unusually candid and sober evaluation of US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright. With the listless pace of progress, Clinton’s
presidential muscle waning and Arafat showing no signs of
flexibility, Oslo is in the same rut just traveled by the flat-lined
Syrian track and it looks increasingly doubtful the parties will meet
the very tight time line just ahead.
Indeed, several senior PA officials have echoed the newest
Palestinian mantra in recent days, contending that they have nothing
new to offer, since they had gone as far as they could simply by
recognizing Israel in the 1993 Oslo Accords. [Never mind that the
original Oslo deal actually saw Israel extricate Arafat’s PLO
from a political and financial wasteland. Ed.] According to
the PLO’s number two man, Mahmoud Abbas, "we will be unable
to take more painful decisions."
Ross and his US peace team will now directly participate in the
next round of negotiations in Eilat from April 30 to May 12, and will
be "pushing each side to fully explain their position."
Meanwhile, the parties acknowledge other channels are also being used
besides the official route. But as departing US State Department
spokesman James Rubin quipped recently, the upcoming talks are "a
complicated piece of business."