In late March, US President Bill Clinton failed in a last-ditch
effort in Geneva to budge ailing Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad from his
cast-iron dictate on where to draw the new border if Israel were to
leave the Golan Heights. Convinced the Syrian track was now closed,
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak began searching for alternate
"arrangements" for pulling the IDF out of south Lebanon by
July and received a face-saving commitment from Secretary General Kofi
Annan that the United Nations would help coordinate such a withdrawal
under its "mandate" of Security Council resolution 425. But
Israel is having to move swiftly to guard its valuable new momentum from
Syrian machinations. Strangely, Damascus and Beirut are trying to
sabotage the Israeli exit, threatening renewed cross-border flare-ups
and reprisals against the SLA.
Since taking office, Barak has placed top priority on reaching an
agreement with Syria over the Golan, in part to facilitate an orderly
IDF withdrawal from south Lebanon by July, as promised in last year’s
election. Talks with Syria resumed with high hopes last December, but
quickly floundered after Assad proved unmovable and Hizb’Allah
inflicted a series of painful blows against Israel and the SLA in the
security zone. Yet despite the escalation in fighting and a wave of
anti-Semitic rhetoric from Arab capitals, Clinton – with Barak’s
consent – was quietly "giving his all" to revive the
battered Syrian track.
While Clinton kept Assad engaged on the phone, Barak convened his
Cabinet in late February to discuss for the first time a Lebanon
withdrawal, believing it might lure Syria back to the peace table. But
the session grew heated after Barak contended that his four predecessors
in office - Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Binyamin
Netanyahu - had all agreed to return the entire Golan. With speculation
already rampant the US was close to sealing a behind-the-scenes
breakthrough, Barak’s remarks were widely viewed as a sign he was on
the brink of surrendering the strategic Golan plateau. But in one way or
another, Barak’s citing of each of the four prime ministers was
soundly refuted over the next few days. And oddly, Barak contradicted
his own position, since he requested and obtained five months earlier an
official State Department clarification that no Israeli leader had ever
committed to a total withdrawal from the Golan.
Just days later, Barak faced a sudden coalition crisis, as three key
government partners - Shas, Yisrael B’Aliyah and the National
Religious Party – voted in support of a Likud-sponsored bill in the
Knesset that would require a "special majority" to approve a
Golan referendum. Although the 60-53 vote was only on the bill’s
preliminary reading, it signaled that Barak would have trouble passing a
Syrian pact in this Knesset, and that he was dealing with Assad from a
position of weakness.
The day after the Knesset defeat, the Syrians offered the Israeli
leader a little double-edged advice to steer the course of capitulation.
The official Syrian press urged him to defy the "racist and
rancorous hotheads" who oppose a Golan deal or his government would
collapse. Meanwhile, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara warned
Barak that plans for a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon were
"suicidal."
PLEASE DON’T GO: At the next Cabinet meeting, Barak won
unanimous approval for his oft-repeated pledge to extract the IDF from
south Lebanon by July. All 23 cabinet ministers concurred -- even those
who had just voted against him on the Golan bill. The tally reflected
the growing public support for leaving Lebanon, whereas Barak’s moves
with Syria enjoy far less popularity. But the strong endorsement was
fraught with risks, as it could either prod Syria to return to
negotiations or expose Israel’s northern communities to increased
attacks.
Syria garrisons some 35,000 troops in Lebanon to maintain a
stranglehold over 90% of the country, and uses Hizb’Allah and other
radical Islamic militias as proxies to slowly bleed Israel - 600 IDF
soldiers have died in the security zone since 1985. If the IDF withdrew,
Hizb’Allah would lose its pretext for attacking Israel, and Syria
would lose its prime lever for prying Israel off the Golan. But Israeli
analysts warn Barak’s strategy could easily backfire, since Assad
might simply continue the fight along the new confrontation line. Barak
threatened, "I don’t advise anyone to test our reaction when we
are deployed on the international border," while other Israeli
officials hinted that Syrian forces and interests in Lebanon may become
direct targets.
In reaction, Damascus successfully swayed the Arab League – meeting
in Beirut for the first time since 1956 – to oppose Israel’s
departure, even though they have agitated for it for years. The
22-nation summit delivered a blistering message that the Arab world
expected total surrender to Syria’s definition of a just and lasting
peace in the region. This included a return to the pre-1967 borders on
all fronts and the return of all Palestinian refugees to Israel. The
harsh declaration also backed Hizb’Allah and urged all Arab states to
freeze normalization of relations with the Jewish state.
The Palestinians were less than enthusiastic about the Syrian
co-option of the refugee issue, viewing it as an unwelcome interference
into their exclusive domain. The communiqué called the presence of some
350,000 Palestinians in Lebanon a "time bomb," and Lebanese
officials began warning that radical Palestinian groups in refugee camps
might resume operations against Israel. Syria controls camps around
Beirut, and has ordered the Lebanese army to round up loyalists of PLO
leader Yasser Arafat in charge of camps in the south. Bashar Assad –
son and heir apparent of the Syrian dictator – now calls the shots in
Lebanon, and likewise threatened a Palestinian insurgency.
Remarkably, Egypt tried to convince their Arab colleagues gathered in
Beirut that Israel’s redeployment was something to be welcomed.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ironically was trying to curtail the
wave of hostility created by his own landmark visit to Lebanon in
February. Mubarak’s change of heart came because of hints the Syrian
talks were back on track. Rumors and press reports abounded that the
bulk of a final accord had been concluded – a leading Israeli TV
commentator claimed a deal was "in the bag" – although US,
Israeli and Syrian officials all issued weak denials.
LAKESIDE DIPLOMACY: Just as many predicted, Clinton and Assad
agreed to meet in Geneva to discuss terms for resuming negotiations.
Since US diplomats had stressed the process would not be renewed in
public unless and until they were sure of its eventual success, most
assumed a deal was close. Assad, rumored to be suffering from leukemia
and dementia, ordered a rare shakeup of his cabinet in mid-March to
ensure a smooth transition of power to his son Bashar, who he hopes will
be supported by the waning Clinton presidency. Barak also had been
stressing the need to secure a quick deal with Assad before he leaves
the scene, although a Gallup poll found nearly 80% of Israelis believe
Israel should wait until a new leader solidifies control in Damascus.
Arab and Israeli sources noted Assad rarely leaves Damascus, and when
asked on the eve of the summit if he had a concrete offer for the Syrian
ruler, Clinton said it was safe to assume "I wouldn’t waste his
time." Clinton reportedly was set to offer Assad up to $15 billion
in US aid and clarified with Barak exactly what he was willing to throw
into the bargain. Barak authorized Clinton to convey to Assad an offer
to draw the new line – though it would be called the "June 4,
1967 border" to placate Syria – somewhere between the uncharted
front lines prevailing on the eve of the Six-Day War and the 1923
international line set by Britain and France that runs generally a
kilometer or two to the east. The main border alteration sought by Barak
was an exchange of a narrow 100-150 meter-wide strip of shoreline on the
Kinneret for the warm springs at Hamat Gader, near the junction of the
Yarmuk and lower Jordan rivers. Otherwise, Barak showed new flexibility
on security arrangements and an early-warning station on Mount Hermon,
betting that a package of advanced American weapons and
intelligence-gathering gizmos could substitute for the strategic depth
of the Golan. In return, Clinton expected to receive Assad’s
assurances concerning water, security, and normalization.
As the two rendezvoused in Switzerland on March 26 for Clinton’s
"last chance" to broker peace, a breakthrough seemed so
imminent Barak reportedly was waiting at a moment’s notice to travel
to Geneva himself. But the talks collapsed as Assad refused to concede a
beachhead on the Kinneret, lecturing Clinton: "I have held
barbecues at the Sea of Galilee, swam in its waters, sat on its shores
and eaten fish from it. I have no intention of giving it up." When
Clinton warned Assad that "generations will go by" before
Israeli-Syrian relations improve if there is no progress now, Assad
replied Syria "is prepared to wait for generations."
A deflated Clinton quickly departed for Washington, and several days
later blamed the impasse directly on Assad, charging "the ball’s
in his court now" to respond to Israel’s "quite
significant" proposals. Syria countered that Clinton brought
nothing new to Geneva, and simply pressured Assad to accept old Israeli
positions, but even Barak concluded that the stubborn Syrian dictator
had "removed his mask," revealing he is "not ready for…
peace."
COVER MY BACK: In the wake of the Geneva fiasco, Barak was
anxious to begin building international support for "Plan B"
– leaving Lebanon without an agreement. But Clinton asked for three
more weeks to exhaust any lingering prospects on the Syrian track.
However, the US soon relented, and the evacuation from Lebanon and the
lagging Palestinian track assumed top priority.
Barak admitted border skirmishes could continue following the IDF
exit, however "with time things will stabilize, because they have
to stabilize." But he clashed with Israeli military chiefs over
where to erect the new line of defense. IDF brass advised retaining a
series of existing outposts within a half-kilometer of the border, the
only place they could "morally" assume responsibility for
protecting the Galilee. But Barak opted to leave Lebanon completely –
to remove any pretext for future attacks. Yet Syria and its terrorist
proxies will cite any excuse to keep the conflict in Lebanon alive. In
recent weeks, Hizb’Allah clerics have cited "Jerusalem," the
"occupied Golan Heights," and the "Palestinian
question" as valid reasons for fighting on; one even demanded
"the return of the Jews to where they came from." Both Lebanon
and Syria said they will not prevent border attacks absent a
comprehensive peace agreement, and again warned that radical Palestinian
groups may rejoin the battle. At one point, Lebanon’s hard-line
defense minister even suggested that Syrian troops occupy south Lebanon
in order to threaten Tel Aviv with missiles.
Yet many Lebanese are concerned about Syria setting off a spiraling
conflict, especially through Palestinian militias that once threw the
country into a 15-year-long civil war. They question why Assad does not
open up his own border with Israel on the Golan to terrorism if he is
not happy with an Israeli pullout.
Israel’s pending withdrawal also sparked calls for a simultaneous
pullout of Syrian troops, as required by UN resolution 520 and at least
three separate agreements brokered by the Arab League. In a rare note of
defiance, leading Arabic papers in London and Beirut wrote of Lebanese
fears that Syria aimed to "swallow" their smaller neighbor,
and pleaded with Damascus to develop plans for a troop departure as a
sign it intends to respect Lebanese sovereignty. One scathing editorial
said, "stop using the Palestinians and Lebanese as pawns in [your]
attempts to regain the Golan." Lebanese Christian students also
staged several days of demonstrations calling for the removal of Syrian
troops, while a barracks for Syrian workers near Sidon was mysteriously
bombed three times in a month.
Egypt also expressed support for Israel’s decision to exit Lebanon,
grilling the Syrian regime, "If you don’t want the Israelis to
leave Lebanon, why don’t you just ask them to stay?" Barak was
banking on similar common sense reactions from the international
community.
In a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy on April 4 in
Geneva – the same venue where the Syrian track ran aground the
previous week – Kofi Annan gave Barak a face-saving commitment that
the UN would coordinate plans with Israel for withdrawing from Lebanon
under the provisions of resolution 425. Annan told Levy he preferred a
beefed-up UNIFIL to fill the "vacuum" created in the wake of
Israel’s pullout, so that no side could bring about "any
deterioration of the situation." Currently, UNIFIL is weakly manned
by smaller member states (some of whom want to abandon the mission),
hampered by budget shortages and used as shields by Hizb’Allah.
ANY EXCUSE WILL DO: Annan’s announcement gave a crucial
boost to Barak’s bid for an "arranged" withdrawal that would
reduce chances of cross-border flare-ups and protect the SLA from harsh
reprisals. Israel also was requesting the UN to verify a full withdrawal
to the international border certified in a 1978 report by then-UN
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.
But just as Israel’s diplomatic campaign gathered steam, Syria and
its puppets in Lebanon began throwing obstacles in the way, demanding
the UN first disarm radical Palestinian elements in Lebanon and
guarantee Israel will end all forays into Lebanon’s airspace and
territorial waters. Lebanon also demanded an Israeli withdrawal to the
1923 boundary set by Britain and France, without specifying how it
varies from the 1978 UN line. Ironically, the Syrians are arguing for a
third frontier, as they want Israel to redeploy on all fronts to the
June 4, 1967 ceasefire lines. The boundary question may prove difficult
to resolve, since none of these borders were ever fully marked in the
field - serving as yet another pretext for violence.
The Assad regime increasingly sensed Israel was managing to isolate
Damascus and expose its domination over Lebanon. Hoping to stymie
Israel’s momentum, FM Shara met in Havana with Annan, who afterwards
said the UN could not proceed until Israel committed in writing to a
full and unconditional exit from Lebanon in strict compliance with 425.
Barak was hastily summoned by Clinton to Washington, where both
leaders relegated the Syrian track to the distant back burner and
Clinton endorsed the IDF withdrawal as in accord with UN resolutions. He
questioned: "What justification will anyone have for
violence?" US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also commented
on the "strange criticism" it has evoked in Lebanon, which has
badgered Israel for years to unconditionally leave at once.
ABOUT FACE: Realizing they were starting to look silly, Syria
and Lebanon finally welcomed Israel’s retreat, charging that Barak was
deceiving the world by saying they were opposed to such a move.
"Such a withdrawal is for sure supported by Syria and Lebanon,
because it is considered a victory for the Lebanese resistance and all
the Arabs," said Shara. After weeks of equivocation, Lebanese Prime
Minister Salim Hoss also belatedly hailed it as a "victory,"
claiming, "For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Israel is forced to withdraw from an Arab territory... it is a
crushing defeat for Israel."
But separately, Hoss warned that Lebanon refused to be responsible
for curbing border violence, and Syria’s official press continued to
lash out at Israel’s course of action. More ominously, top Syrian
officials met with several Palestinian terrorist chiefs, including Hamas
leaders recently given a new home in Damascus. As if on cue, pro-Syrian
PLO units in Lebanon vowed "There will be no peace, no security and
no stability to the occupier," and stepped up recruiting and
military training efforts.
Undeterred, Barak lifted a building freeze on the Golan – to the
immense relief of local residents – and FM Levy formally notified
Annan of Israel’s firm plans to leave Lebanon by July 7, in
cooperation with the UN and full compliance with resolution 425.
Levy’s letter essentially commits Israel to a pullback to the 1978 UN
border, and to dismantling IDF bases in Lebanon. Levy wrote Israel now
expects the UN to honor its role in restoring calm to the border area.
Annan started the ball rolling in the Security Council and indicated he
will seek an enlargement of UNIFIL from 4,500 to 7,000 troops.
With an IDF pullback looming ever closer, thousands of
south Lebanese face an agonizing decision - flee their homes or stay and
face harsh reprisals. After fighting - and dying - for peace in their
local, hilly turf, most of the zone’s residents consider themselves
"patriots," but Hizb’Allah has vowed to punish them as
"traitors." Israel says it might take some in, but most in the
resilient community would prefer to remain under some form of protection
and eventually reunite peacefully with their Lebanese brethren. They are
clinging to hopes that Western nations - so averse to the plight of
refugees - will step in prevent Syria and its terrorist proxies from
exacting revenge and fomenting another refugee crisis. Otherwise, they
have vowed to continue defending themselves and are opposing plans for
disarming them of everything but light personal weapons.