Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of
Germany in 1933 and between then and 1937 about 130,000 Jews fled from
Germany. At that time refugees were
allowed to take some of their property with them and there were not many
problems with resettlement in other countries.
Hitler's campaign against the
Jews was gradual as he did not want to offend public opinion in Germany or
invite international reaction. There
would also be a danger that if he acted too quickly it might cause economic
hardship in Germany as the Jewish community held positions of influence in the
financial world.
From Hitler's rise to power in
1933 Jews were victimised by beatings and killings, which happened on a regular
basis. A one-day boycott was organised
against "Jewish domination" and despite protests from several countries this
was used as a forerunner for a permanent boycott to ruin Jewish
businesses. Between 1933 and 1937, 125
anti-Jewish laws were enacted.
Jews were banned from civil
service posts, hospitals, courts, government, educational and cultural life and
sport. Jewish books were publicly
burned, and Jewish shops and offices were marked with a "J" or "Jude." In September 1935 Nuremberg Laws cancelled
Jewish citizenship and made illegal marriages or sexual intercourse between
Jews and Aryans. It was believed by
many Jews, and in countries watching Hitler with concern, that the Nuremberg
decrees would at least give Jews a legal and permanent position even if it were
a subservient one in Nazi Germany.
However, Hitler had also warned in his Nuremberg speech:
"If this arrangement for a
'separate secular solution' broke down, then it might become necessary to pass
a law handing over the problem to the National Socialist Party for 'final
solution'."1
Anti-Semitic handbooks were given to
teachers and Jews were blamed for everything that had gone wrong in German
society. Frequent arrests brought fear
and resulted in around twenty suicides each day.
Hitler threatened and promised
violence against Jews in speeches and in Mein Kampf. His attitude to
them and their future under his regime is summed up in a private talk with
Major Josef Hell in 1922 when he said that if he won power the annihilation of
Jews would be his first and foremost task.
He continued, "Once the hatred and the battle against the Jews are
really stirred up, their resistance will inevitably break down in short
order. They cannot protect themselves
and no one will stand forth as their defenders."2
It was eleven days after Hitler
annexed Austria that President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the USA decided to call
a conference as it was now going to cause the additional problem of Austrian
Jews being expelled from their homeland.
Switzerland was unwilling to host the conference, as they did not want
to alienate Hitler. They also were embarrassed, as they too had begun to
restrict immigration of Jews from Germany and Austria. It was decided that the
venue should be Evian-les-Bains on the shores of Lake Geneva in France. Thirty-three countries including Britain,
her dominions, and her colonies, Scandinavian and other European and Latin
American countries were also invited.
Some countries, which would have liked to be included, were not invited,
including the Republic of Ireland, which eventually did attend, and Luxembourg. Poland and Rumania were rejected, as they
were not regarded as likely countries of Jewish immigration but they, and the
Union of South Africa sent observers to the conference. Henry Feingold says that Portugal's
exclusion proved a serious mistake, as the main hope for the majority of
resettlement at one time was Angola, a Portuguese colony3
Germany was not invited to the
conference on the advice of American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull because
he felt it would be better to find a
solution to the refugee problem "than to negotiate with the felon about his
misdeeds."4 Hitler glibly remarked at an election
speech in Königsberg that he would willingly let Jews leave "even on luxury
ships."5
He made no comment however about relaxing laws on the transfer of
capital and property which was the main obstacle to their migration.
It was made clear to the
participating countries that none would be asked to increase their quota of
refugees but that solutions to the Jewish refugee problem would be
discussed. However, Roosevelt
recommended that his Consular Service remove unnecessary red tape for visa
requests from those wishing to emigrate from Germany and Austria and to give
these cases more sympathetic handling at US consulates. This immediately increased the numbers of
immigrants into the US which, before then had not reached anywhere near the
legal annual German quota of 25,957.6
Britain was agreeable to co-operate with
the conference but was concerned that Palestine, which it ruled under a League
of Nations Mandate, might be suggested as a recipient country for
refugees. This would cause problems
with the Arabs, whom they wished to appease in order to prevent another Arab
uprising that took place in 1936 against Jewish immigration to Palestine, and a
revolt against a three-way partition of the country in 1937. Britain therefore insisted that Palestine be
left off the list of receiving countries for refugees. Palestine unlike other countries before the
war did not have unemployment but had a labour shortage. The country was prosperous due to the
Zionists who were chiefly responsible for the boom.
The Christian churches in
Palestine also had an influence on British policy towards Jewish
emigration. They too wanted to appease
the Arabs who made up a large proportion of their congregation. They also wanted
to preserve their own position and influence in the Holy Land. The idea of partitioning Palestine, they
also felt, would reduce opportunities for Christian missionary work and other
activities.7 In a letter to The Times signed by
the Bishop of Jerusalem and other church leaders on behalf of the Anglican
Church it was denied that Palestine was capable of solving the European Jewish
problem. The letter also stated that
since huge numbers of Jewish immigrants had arrived there in 1935 "Palestine
had known no peace."8
The Roman Catholic Church did not
support the immigration of Jews to Palestine or the Balfour Declaration that
declared it a Homeland for the Jews. In
a letter dated 22nd June 1943 to Myron Taylor, President Roosevelt's
special emissary to the pope, A.G. Cicognani, special representative of pope
Pius XII said:
"It is true that at one time
Palestine was inhabited by the Hebrew Race, but there is no axiom in history to
substantiate the necessity of a people returning to a country they left nineteen
centuries before …… If a 'Hebrew Home' is desired, it would not be too
difficult to find a more fitting territory than Palestine. With an increase in the Jewish population
there, grave, new international problems would arise."9
Much of the British Press was
also opposed to Jewish immigration to Palestine. In 1933 the Daily Telegraph approved the statement of the
British delegate to the permanent Mandates Commission that 'quite definitely,
the Palestinian Government's immigration policy was, and must be, wholly
unaffected by the situation of the German Jews.'10
The Times maintained that the problem of Palestine had to be separated
from the situation of the Jews in Europe, "…..It is painfully obvious that
Palestine alone cannot meet the needs of the Jewish Community in the Reich."11
The Daily Telegraph commented:
"On one side stands the Zionist demand
for the fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration and the League Mandate, the
provision of a National Home for the Jews, where, in an increasingly inhospitable
world, they may come and settle as of right ….. on the other ….. the policy,
which demands the permanent cessation of Jewish immigration and an independent
Arab Palestine.12
Even after the devastating
Crystal Night the editorial of Great Britain and the East stated :
Humanitarianism and the Jews
"….. the connection between persecution
and Palestine, is sentimental and coincidental ….. At the risk of being accused
of lack of humanitarian feeling we say explicitly that British obligations in
Palestine cannot forever or even temporarily be influenced by the malefactions
of certain European States towards their Jews."13
The attitude of the American
Government to the Palestinian issue can be summed up in a telegram from Myron
Taylor to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, and Sumner Welles saying, "….Later
in the day. Dr. Goldmann arrived and presented the case for Palestine with a
strong recommendation that I receive Dr. Weizmann before the Evian meeting. I
replied that I could not give him an immediate answer and discussed the
position with Palairet who said that his government would naturally prefer that
this meeting should not take place. I
said there would be opportunity for Dr. Weizmann to present his case privately
at Evian if he so desired and that I would not see him before the conference
met.14
Chaim Weizmann says of Palestine,
"In those days before the war, our protests, when voiced, were regarded as
provocations; our very refusal to subscribe to our own death sentence became a
public nuisance, and was taken in bad part.
Alternating threats and appeals were addressed to us to acquiesce in the
surrender of Palestine."15
Another British concern was that
the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, suggested by President Roosevelt,
would replace the League of Nations.
The League had not been successful in helping refugees as it was starved
of funds and had little power. It's
President, James Macdonald said in his letter of resignation, "When domestic
polices threaten the demoralization and exile of hundreds of thousands of human
beings, considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of common
humanity. I should be recreant if I did not call attention to the actual
situation, and plead that world opinion, acting through the League and its
Member-States and other countries, move to avert the existing and impending
tragedies."16 For example, between 1933 and 1938 130,000
Jews had left Germany, 43,000 had gone to Palestine and 55,000 to North America
and the South American republics, but 32,000 were still refugees.
Britain was also pessimistic
regarding the outcome of the conference unless the USA took a lead, or 'the
meeting would be chiefly occupied with passing the buck'17 S.A. Waley, who was Jewish and a
principal assistant secretary involved with finance, was also not optimistic
saying, "I am afraid that the Evian Conference is bound to be somewhat of a
fiasco. Few governments seem likely to
promise to take more refugees than they are doing at present, or to commit
themselves to any definite number. The
conference seems, therefore, likely to do no more than express platonic
sympathies and to set up an Intergovernmental Committee, which does not seem
likely to serve any useful purpose, and may do actual harm by hampering the
activities of the new high commissioner."18
The British Ambassador Neville
Henderson writing to Lord Halifax said that attacks on Germany would only
worsen the situation of the persecuted and that the best policy for British
delegates at Evian was to make the reception of German and Austrian Jews in
England dependent on the amounts of property they were allowed to export as an
incentive to the German government, who strongly desired to get rid of the
Jews, to relax the stringent capital export tax. He concluded, "I would deprecate an attitude by the British
delegation as regards Germany's policy towards the Jews however uncivilised and
deplorable, it is, in the Chancellor's eyes, is Germany's own business, even
though she will probably be the greatest sufferer in the end19 When told of Henderson's views, Lord
Winterton gave the assurance the he and the British delegates would bear in
mind the need to avoid provoking the Reich government. He went on to say that the Evian Conference
proved that the German Government's policy of financially ruining and expelling
its Jewish population raised 'questions of world-wide importance' and that the
German government itself should make some contribution towards a solution of
the problem."20
The Australian government
accepted the invitation to attend the conference on the condition that Britain
would also attend. If they did not, according to the Secretary of the
Department of External Affairs, 'Australia would be subject to criticism if the
invitation was refused, especially as the need for increased population for
Australia has been recently and consistently stressed by government and other
spokesmen."21
The Minister for the Interior, J.
McEwen pointed out in a Cabinet discussion on 8 April 1938 that the current
policy on Jewish refugee immigration was that the Jews were
'…..highly intelligent as a class
and usually made a success at whatever occupation or business they follow, but
in view of their religious beliefs and strict rules as regards marriage, they
remain a separate race and this failure to become properly assimilated in the
country of adoption appears to create difficulties in any country where they
form a considerable proportion of the population."22
In a further memorandum McEwen
recommended:
'If it were decided to limit the
number of Jews to be granted permits to enter Australia it would appear
desirable to give preference to Austrian and German Jews because of the greater
need, and because they have become more assimilated in European ways, say, than
the Jews of Poland where they have practically formed a state within a state.'23
Australia's very negative
attitude to the immigration of Jews resulted in the decision of the Cabinet in
June 1938 to allow only 300 landing permits each month to be granted to Jews with
a preference given to Austrians and Germans.
An example of the attitude of the
Canadian Government to Jewish Refugees is that of a senior Canadian official
who, when asked after the war how many Jews would be allowed into Canada, said,
"None, is too many."24
Canada had a tight immigration
policy from the 1920s as they wanted to restrict the numbers of those deemed
lest desirable and only those who had the funds to set up and sustain
themselves were welcome. A number of
Canadian officials in high positions in the government were anti-Semitic,
including the Prime Minister Mackenzie King and Frederick Blair, Director of
Immigration who said, "Canada was in danger of being flooded with Jewish
people…" unless he ensured that they were kept out and believed they conspired
with their relatives already in Canada to get themselves admitted. He would deny being anti-Semitic believing
he was only being realistic about Canada's immigration policy.25
It was hoped by three new Jewish
MPs and the Jewish community of Canada that the new Liberal government of 1935
would modify the strict and harsh laws of the Conservative Bennett government
regarding immigration. However it was
decided that no exceptions would be made for German Jews unless they had enough
money to set up successful farms – they would not be allowed in under any
circumstances.26
Canada was further restricting
Jewish immigration when President Roosevelt suggested the Evian Conference.
They therefore feared that, according to Irving Abella and Harold Troper, once
the Canadians had committed themselves to attending the conference they 'would
be expected to do something to alleviate the refugee problem. This situation
caused great anxiety to Prime Minister Mackenzie King as it meant "admitting
numbers of Jews." These fears were
strengthened by Under-Secretary of State Skelton, who warned that the publicity
generated by the conference would likely result in strong "domestic pressure"
in Canada to do something "for the Jews."
King feared a violent reaction from Quebec to any admission of Jewish
refugees as almost all French–language newspapers had warned the government
against allowing European Jews to immigrate to Canada. Le Devoir asked
"Why allow in Jewish refugees?…..The Jewish shopkeeper on St. Lawrence
boulevard does nothing to increase our natural resources." Abella and Troper go on to say that this was
mild in comparison with vicious anti-Semitic remarks made regularly in other
Quebec newspapers and French-Canadian politicians such as H.E. Brunell who said
that Jews caused "great difficulties" wherever they lived.27
The Jewish Congress was afraid of
an anti-Semitic backlash and alienating the government. Its role was therefore
to monitor Jewish opinion and try to prevent outrage and demonstrations or
meetings that would attract adverse publicity.
The Canadian government's slow
response in replying to the invitation to attend the conference was an
indication of its reluctance to be present.
They further emphasised their disquiet when Skelton made it clear that
Canada's participation at Evian should not be construed by anyone to imply that
a Canadian initiative was on the agenda. He also argued that accepting refugees
might be counter-productive to Jewish people themselves as they might be subjected
to persecution. Countries with unwanted minorities should not be encouraged to
think that if they ill treat these minorities that they can absolve themselves
of responsibility by expecting other countries to open their doors to refugees.28
American Jews were overjoyed at
Roosevelt's initiative and responded with wires and letters informing him of
their delight. Jewish organisations
united, where previously they had disagreed on the Zionist demand for a Homeland
in Palestine. Those in possible resettlement countries offered to assist
destitute Jews arriving from Germany and Austria without capital if they were
allowed to immigrate.
Various motives have been
attributed to President Roosevelt for calling the conference. These include his genuine concern for the
Jewish people who were being persecuted and were in a critical state if they
could not find refuge in another country.
Michael Blakeney cites Time as believing that the proposal was
designed to express in a practical way American disapproval of Germany's
annexation of Austria. Newsweek thought it was part of the
Administration's plan to divert public opinion from isolationism to more
'active opposition' to 'international gangsters'.29 It may also have been that he was
responding to pressure from the huge American Jewish lobby who naturally wanted
safe havens to be found for their fellow Jews of Germany and Austria who would
otherwise be in desperate straights. According to Henry Feingold, Rabbi Stephen
Wise, President of the American Jewish Congress, for whom the President held a
great deal of affection, was instrumental in influencing his decision. It may
also have been a subtle attempt by Roosevelt to change public opinion to the
growing menace of Nazism or Jane Addams' theory that increased immigration
helped the economy.30 Ben
Cohen, a White House confidant, told an official of the Intergovernmental
Committee that, if and when negotiations with Germany failed, the world would
regard the Nazis as the villains.31 Richard Breitman points out that President
Roosevelt estimated that the total number of potential refugees was ten to
twenty million.32 He could have abandoned the refugee issue as
there were important defence and foreign policy issues to be dealt with. However, he divided the problem into long
term and short time concerns. The long
time aim was a huge resettlement strategy, which could continue throughout the
war but could not be acted upon until its end.33 A less admirable motive was attributed to
him that he did not want to have to increase or liberalise the USA immigration
laws and hoped to persuade other countries to take the responsibility for the
refugees. Cordell Hull said the real purpose of the conference was to give the
United States the initiative "to get out in front and attempt to guide the
pressure primarily with a view toward forestalling attempts to have
immigrations laws liberalized."34 Roosevelt
said to Judge Lehman, "It is my hope, that the narrow isolationists will
not use this move of ours for purely partisan objectives – but no one can
tell."35 Restrictionist leader Thomas A.
Jenkins had criticised Roosevelt saying he had gone "on a visionary excursion
into the warm fields of altruism. He
forgets the cold winds of poverty and penury that are sweeping over the 'one
third' of our people who are ill clothed, ill housed, ill fed."36
Breitman sums up President
Roosevelt's attitude to the refugees by commenting "…FDR had at least made
clear that he regarded the refugee issue as a matter of international
humanitarianism….Roosevelt could claim that he had placed the United States in
a humanitarian role on the refugee issue, at least symbolically. But he could
also be content that he had neither tampered with the nation's restrictionist
policies, nor cost himself the votes of the millions of Americans who continued
to oppose the admission of refugees."37
Feingold concludes that whatever
Roosevelt's motives were, the timing of the conference was clearly that of the
President's choosing, and was made against the background of a worsening
refugee situation.38
Roosevelt also made up his own mind regarding who would represent the USA at
the Evian Conference and decided on his personal friend Myron C. Taylor who had
been head of the United States Steel Company to be in charge of the delegation.
Taylor was given the title of Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary to
emphasise the importance of the conference.
Sumner Welles had suggested that the Secretary of State, Frances Perkins
(Minister of Labour), George Messersmith (temporary Assistant Secretary of
State) and himself make up the delegation, giving it the importance of rank but
the President may have thought a delegation would be too powerful. Sumner
Welles, an Undersecretary at the State Department, had a real concern for the
welfare of the refugees and Feingold says that it was his drive and
organisational skills were central to the President's initiative. However, he
was also concerned about the reaction of Restrictionists and his tentative
agenda for the conference noted that the US "could not change its immigration
laws and expected no one else to do so."39
S. Adler-Rudel who attended the
conference says that an unofficial Jewish delegations from Palestine who
discussed the Agenda for the conference with James G. Macdonald while
travelling to Evian concluded that even Macdonald, one of the leading American
delegates had no clear idea about the method, duration or intended results of
the conference. He himself had a
conversation with Myron C. Taylor and others that led him to the conclusion
there was only a slight hope of success.
He says "All those anxiously
following the developments became increasingly aware that no constructive plan
had been worked out and that the entire Conference was in fact little more than
a feeble improvisation."40
Go to Chapter 2 - The Evian Conference And Its Proceedings
©2001 Annette Shaw